The hypothesis of de-infiltration of government, shows that if the host country has ratified a trade agreement with other countries, the government of those countries should be less likely to seriously interfere in commercial disputes and lawsuits. Therefore, the current research was considered with the aim of investigating the role of multilateral and regional agreements in de-infiltration of governments in commercial lawsuits from the perspective of diplomacy. Using the data of 86 disputes in Asian countries from 2021 to 2022, a logit model was explained and analyzed by estimating it. Netaich showed that the de-infiltration of governments in commercial lawsuits is more due to the issue of whether the political influence of governments in lawsuits is consistent with their strategic interests or not, instead of taking into account the extent of political influence of economic agents. Thus, they are typically encouraged to agree to arbitration in multilateral and regional agreements in exchange for less political influence in commercial disputes. While governments frequently intervene in developing world disputes, powerful governments rarely use threats, outright sanctions, and political influence in trade disputes. The lack of political influence of governments in the framework of multilateral and regional agreements has led to the institutionalization of the legal system to resolve commercial disputes, which results in less forced and aggressive diplomatic interventions. Finally, in the agreements, ambiguous standards due to multiple interpretations due to the malleability of language and the uncertain future should be considered as an important challenge.
heidari haratemeh M. De-Infiltration of Governments in Commercial litigation in the Framework of Multilateral and Regional Agreements. qjfep 2023; 11 (43) :131-153 URL: http://qjfep.ir/article-1-1436-en.html